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INVESTED WITH A STRANGE AUTHORITY:
A GUIDE TO THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND RELATED
ISSUES IN TENNESSEE
By Jason R. Smith1
“Old scarred marble floors in a cold white corridor. A room
where the mad sat at their work. To Suttree they seemed like
figures from a dream, something from the past . . . . He’d
never been among the certified and he was surprised to find
them invested with a strange authority, like folk who’d had to
do with death some way and had come back, something about
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them of survivors in a realm that all must reckon with soon or
late.” 2

I. INTRODUCTION
The insanity defense has long been viewed as one of the
most controversial areas of substantive criminal law. 3 The
public perception of the insanity defense is that it “is a
commonly used device that allows criminals who deserve to be
punished to escape any sort of retribution.” 4 In truth, the
insanity defense “is a device that is rarely used and even more
rarely successful” with “most defendants who are able to
successfully raise it . . . spending an immense . . . amount of time
under state-supervised hospitalization, treatment, and
institutionalization.”5
The insanity defense plays a major role in Tennessee
criminal law despite its infrequent use because “[m]ental
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense”
outside the statutorily provided definition of insanity. 6
Therefore, criminal law practitioners in Tennessee must
contend with the insanity defense as it is now codified
regardless of the controversies surrounding it. Or, as the
Tennessee Supreme Court stated in 1827, “[w]hatever
differences of opinion there may be as to the construction and
operations of the mind of man, whatever difficulty in
discovering the various degrees of unsoundness, it is only
necessary for us to ascertain the kind of prostration of intellect
which is requisite to free a man from punishment for crime by

CORMAC MCCARTHY, SUTTREE 431 (Vintage International 1992) (1979)
(describing the patients at the now closed Lakeshore Mental Health
Institute in Knoxville, Tennessee).
3 See James F. Hooper, M.D, The Insanity Defense: History and Problems
25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 409 (2006).
4 Louis Kachulis, Note, Insane in the Mens Rea: Why Insanity Defense
Reform is Long Overdue 26 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 357, 362 (2017) (noting
that the insanity defense “is raised in less than 1 percent of all crimina l
cases, and is thought to be successful in no more than 30 percent of
those cases”).
5 Id.
6 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018).
2
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the law of the land.” 7
Consequently, Part I of this article will examine the
current state of the insanity defense in Tennessee and the most
common issues that arise when it is litigated. Part II of this
article will provide a general overview of the present version of
the insanity defense, looking at its background, the procedural
prerequisites for raising it, and its elements. Part III will
examine the burden of proof for the insanity defense. Part IV
will discuss the scope of expert testimony with respect to the
insanity defense. Part V will examine what happens after the
insanity defense has been litigated at trial, looking at the
appellate standard of review and the procedure upon a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Part VI will briefly examine
some issues related to the insanity defense such as “diminished
capacity,” sentencing, and post-conviction claims.

II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN TENNESSEE
A. BACKGROUND
Insanity is a legal term of art and not a medical
diagnosis. 8 In Tennessee, the insanity defense is codified at
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-501 which states in
full:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness
of the defendant’s acts. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense. The
Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 147, 156 (1827).
See 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2 D 615 Insanity Defense § 1 (Apr. 2018
Update) (noting that insanity “is a legal and not a medical question” );
Insanity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting that insanity
“is a legal, not a medical, standard”). The term “insanity” is “used in
different criminal law settings” and “frequently encountered in legal
situations quite outside the criminal law.” WAYNE R. LA FAVE, 1 SUBST.
CRIM. L. § 7.1(a) (3d ed.). With the exception of some limited
discussion in Part VI, this article will focus on the insanity defense. All
other uses of the term “insanity” are beyond the scope of this article.
7
8
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defendant has the burden of proving the defense
of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or
defect” does not include any abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
(c) No expert witness may testify as to whether
the defendant was or was not insane as set forth
in subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter
for the trier of fact alone.
Subsection (a) is the operative part of the statute. Subsection
(b) is designed to deny the insanity defense “to psychopaths,
i.e., those repeat offenders without other medically discernible
symptoms.” 9 Subsection (c) addresses the scope of expert
witness testimony with respect to the insanity defense.
The original version of section 39-11-501 was modeled
on the standard found in the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code that had previously been adopted by the
Tennessee Supreme Court.10 However, section 39-11-501 was
significantly amended in 1995 and has not been amended
since.11 The current version of section 39-11-501 was
“patterned after and virtually identical to the federal Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984.”12 The Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984, which was designed to “tighten the traditional
insanity rule,” was enacted in response “to a large public
outcry” following the acquittal by reason of insanity of John
Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President
Ronald Regan.13 Likewise, “[t]he 1995 amendment [of section
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (2018), Sentencing Comm’n cmts.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1989), Sentencing Comm’n cmts.;
Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 543-44 (Tenn. 1977) (adopting the
Model Penal Code standard).
11 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1995); State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905,
910 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (acknowledging the amendment and
comparing the previous and current versions of section 39-11-501).
12 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 911.
13 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 360.
9

10
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39-11-501] was an obvious expression of legislative intent to
restrict the defense of insanity.” 14 As such, any caselaw
involving a pre-July 1, 1995 offense should be considered
highly suspect even though such caselaw still appears in
treatises and annotations to section 39-11-501.

B. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES
Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2,
a defendant who intends to assert the insanity defense at trial
must “notify the district attorney general in writing and file a
copy of the notice with the [trial court] clerk.” 15 The State is not
required to make “a triggering request.” 16 Instead, “[t]he
burden is upon the defendant to give notice of any defense
based upon [a] mental condition.” 17 The notice must “be given
within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at
such later time as the court may direct.” 18 Rule 12.2 gives the
trial court the discretion to “allow the defendant to file the
notice late, grant additional trial preparation time, or make
other appropriate orders” when “cause [has been] shown.”19
Failure to comply with the written notice requirement bars the
defendant from raising the insanity defense at trial.20
Rule 12.2 also requires that written notice be provided
to the district attorney general and a copy filed with the trial
court clerk if the defendant “intends to introduce expert
testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other
mental condition of the defendant bearing on the issue of his or
her guilt.” 21 This is because “lack of notice about the
defendant’s mental state may seriously disadvantage the
Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910-11.
R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(1) (2018).
16 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2 (2018), Advisory Comm’n cmt.
17 Id.
18 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(2). It should be noted that Rule 12.2
requires that this notice be provided sooner than Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-11-204(c)(1) which states that written notice of
an affirmative defense shall be provided “no later than ten . . . days
before trial.”
19 Id.
20 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a)(3) (2018).
21 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(b)(1) (2018).
14

15 Tenn.
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district attorney general in preparing possible rebuttal proof.”22
This notice must also be given “within the time provided for the
filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may
direct.” 23 The trial court “may exclude the testimony of any
expert witness offered by the defendant on the issue of the
defendant’s mental condition” if the defendant fails to comply
with the notice requirement.24
In addition to the notice requirements, the trial court
“may order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by
a psychiatrist or other expert designated in the court order”
upon motion of the district attorney general.25 Statements of the
defendant made “in the course of any examination conducted
under” Rule 12.2(c), as well as testimony about those
statements, are not “admissible against the defendant in any
criminal proceeding, except for impeachment purposes or on
an issue concerning a mental condition on which the defendant
has introduced testimony.” 26 The trial court may exclude the
testimony of the defendant’s expert witness if the defendant
“does not submit to an examination ordered under Rule
12.2(c).”27 Given the harshness of its penalties, Rule 12.2 should
be closely examined and followed if there is a possibility that
the defendant’s mental condition will be an issue at trial.

C. ELEMENTS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The elements of the insanity defense found in the
current version of section 39-11-501 are as follows: “at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the
defendant’s acts.” 28 Put another way, the elements of the
22 Tenn.

R. Crim. P. 12.2 (2018), Advisory Comm’n cmt.
R. Crim. P. 12.2(b)(2) (2018).
24 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(d) (2018).
25 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(1) (2018).
26 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(2) (2018).
27 Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.2(d) (2018).
28 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018). This is in sharp contra st
with the original version of section 39-11-501 which “allowed the
defense, ‘if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disea se
23 Tenn.
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insanity defense are that the defendant, at the time of the
offense, (1) suffered from a severe mental disease or defect, and
as a result (2) was unable to appreciate either (a) the nature or
(b) the wrongfulness of their acts.
The first element is that, at the time of the offense, the
defendant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect. The
1995 amendment to section 39-11-501 added the requirement
that the mental disease or defect be “severe.” 29 What constitutes
a severe mental disease or defect is not defined by the statute.
However, examples from caselaw include schizophrenia,30
delusional disorder,31 bipolar disorder with psychotic
episodes,32 schizoaffective disorder,33 brief psychotic disorder,34
moderate mental retardation, 35 and major depression.36 In most
cases, this element will not be disputed at trial.37
Instead, the outcome of an insanity defense case will
usually turn on whether the defendant has established the
second element of the defense, that the defendant was unable
to appreciate either the nature or the wrongfulness of their acts.
Whether the defendant “understood the nature of his actions or
or defect, the person lacked substantial capacity either to apprecia te
the wrongfulness of the person’s conduct or to conform that conduct
to the requirements of law.’” Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910 (quoting TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1991)).
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (1995); Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910
(recognizing the change in the statutory language).
30 State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003); Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 905.
31 State v. Hank Wise, No. M2012-02520-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 992102
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014).
32 State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
33 State v. Colvett, 481 S.W.3d 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014); State v.
John Stephen Steele, No. E2006-00039-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2681784
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2007).
34 State v. Michael Halliburton, No. W2015-02157-CCA-R3-CD, 2016
WL 7102747 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Apr. 13, 2017).
35 State v. Ann Marie Thornton Kelly, No. M2001-01054-CCA-R3 -CD,
2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2002).
36 State v. Daryl Keith Holton, No. M2000-00766-CCA-R3-DD, 2002
WL 1574995 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2002), aff’d, State v. Holton, 126
S.W.3d 845 (Tenn. 2004).
37 See, e.g., Colvett, 481 S.W.3d at 197; Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d at 22;
Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 912.
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. . . the wrongfulness of his actions” are “two separate prongs,”
and “a defendant need only prove one prong to be successful in
his defense.” 38 The inability of the defendant to appreciate the
nature of their acts is illustrated by the “oft-cited example” of a
defendant who strangles their spouse but believes that they are
“squeezing lemons.” 39 As for the term “wrongfulness,” it is not
defined in the statute.
The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions characterize
“wrongfulness” as the defendant’s inability “to understand
what [they were] doing was wrong.” 40 The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals has held that this instruction is “a complete
and correct charge of the current law concerning an insanity
defense.” 41 The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has also
interpreted the term “wrongfulness” as including both legal
and moral wrongfulness.42 Having examined the background
and the elements of the current version of the insanity defense,
the next sections will address several common issues that arise
with it.

III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The most significant change in the 1995 amendment to
section 39-11-501 was to alter the burden of proof for the
insanity defense.43 Prior to the 1995 amendment, section 39-11501 “provided that insanity was simply a ‘defense.’” 44 Also
under the original version of section 39-11-501, “if the evidence
adduced raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s sanity,
the burden of proof then fell upon the [S]tate to establish sanity
State v. Richard Anthony Arriola, No. M2007-00428-CCA-R3 -CD,
2009 WL 2733746, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2009).
39 LA FAVE , supra note 8, at § 7.1(b); see also T.P.I.-Crim. 40.16 (2018)
(characterizing this prong as a defendant’s inability to understa nd
what they were doing).
40 T.P.I.-Crim. 40.16 (2018).
41 Wise, 2014 WL 992102, at *16 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Brian Val Kelley, No. M2001-00461-CCA-R3 -CD,
2002 WL 927610, at *25-26 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2002)).
42 State v. Robert E. Odle, No. M2014-00349-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL
6607013, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2014).
43 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 910.
44 Id.
38
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beyond a reasonable doubt.” 45 To that end, the State could
present “any ‘evidence which [was] consistent with sanity and
inconsistent with insanity.’” 46
In contrast, the current version of section 39-11-501
provides that insanity “is an affirmative defense to
prosecution” and that “[t]he defendant has the burden of
proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing
evidence.” 47 Section 39-11-501 now “places the burden of
establishing [the] affirmative defense [of insanity] squarely on
the defendant.” 48 While the State “is required to prove all
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sanity
is not an element of a crime.”49 As such, the Tennessee Supreme
Court has “explicitly reject[ed] the notion that the State must
rebut defense proof of insanity with substantial evidence.” 50
“In determining whether a defendant is insane, [the trier
of fact] is entitled to consider all the evidence offered, including
the facts surrounding the crime, the testimony of lay witnesses,
and expert testimony.” 51 The trier of fact “may not arbitrarily
ignore evidence,” but it is “not bound to accept the testimony
of experts [when] the evidence is contested.” 52 In light of this,
the State will likely attempt to counter the defendant’s proof of
insanity “by contrary expert testimony, lay witnesses, or
vigorous cross-examination designed to undermine the
credibility of the defense experts” even though that the State is
not required to rebut the defendant’s proof with substantial
evidence.53
The current version of section 39-11-501 makes the
defendant’s burden of proving insanity exceptionally heavy.
This difficulty is illustrated in the caselaw on the insanity
45 Id.
46 Id.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018). Evidence is clear and
convincing when “there is no serious or substantial doubt about the
correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v.
S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992).
48 State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002).
49 Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 911.
50 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554.
51 Id. at 556.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 554.
47
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defense since the 1995 amendment took effect. For example, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed a trial court’s
rejection of the insanity defense in State v. Holder despite two
expert witnesses having testified that the defendant was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.54 Instead, the
trial court “relied primarily upon the actions and words of the
defendant before, at[,] and after the commission of the
offense.” 55
Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a
jury’s rejection of the insanity defense in State v. Flake in spite of
the fact that four expert witnesses testified that the defendant
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and
a fifth expert witness testified that the defendant felt morally
justified in his conduct.56 Instead, the court noted that “the facts
surrounding the offense suggest[ed] [that] the defendant
realized his conduct was wrongful.” 57 The court relied on the
fact that the defendant shot only the victim, that he fled after
the shooting, that he “appeared to realize he had committed a
crime” at the time of his arrest, and that he exhibited “no bizarre
behavior” at the time of his arrest.58
By contrast, the sole example of a Tennessee appellate
court applying the current version of section 39-11-501 of a
defendant having satisfied the burden of proof is State v.
Kennedy.59 In Kennedy, the jury convicted the defendant of
54 15

S.W.3d at 909, 911-12.
at 912.
56 88 S.W.3d at 544-48, 556-57.
57 Id. at 556.
58 Id.
59 152 S.W.3d at 16. In State v. Flake, the Tennessee Court of Crimina l
Appeals originally held that the defendant had established insanity
by clear and convincing evidence at trial and modified the jury’ s
guilty verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity, but that opinion was
reversed by the Tennessee Supreme Court and the jury’s verdict was
reinstated. Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 542; see also State v. Christopher Flake,
No. W2001-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1298773 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 12, 2002), rev’d, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). The Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals made similar holdings in two other cases prior to
the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Flake. State v. Luis
Anthony Ramon, No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1841608
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2002), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Dec. 23,
55 Id.

30

5 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2018)

vehicular homicide and three other offenses, but the trial court
granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
grounds that she had established insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.60 The State appealed and the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.61
In making its decision, the trial court relied on the fact that three
experts testified that the defendant suffered from bipolar
disorder with psychotic episodes and that she could not
appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of her actions, that there
was nothing in the defendant’s conduct leading up to the
offense to counter that opinion, that the defendant’s statement
after the offense “clearly evidence[d] continuing delusion,” and
that there was no evidence that the defendant was
malingering.62
It is highly unlikely that an appellate court would
overturn a trier of fact’s rejection of the insanity defense in an
instance when the defense and the State have presented
conflicting expert testimony. As illustrated by the cases
discussed above, it is still very unlikely that an appellate court
would reverse a guilty verdict even when the experts agree in
favor of insanity so long as there is evidence in the record
countering the Defendant’s claim of insanity. The Kennedy
opinion provides the only caselaw for defense counsel to
favorably compare to a defendant’s case while attempting to
distinguish the plethora of unfavorable decisions issued since
2002); State v. Claude W. Cheeks, No. E2001-00198-CCA-R3-CD, 2002
WL 1609743 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2002), perm. app. granted (Tenn.
Dec. 23, 2002). Then Judge Joseph M. Tipton filed dissenting opinions
in both cases arguing that the defendants’ convictions should have
been affirmed on appeal. Cheeks, 2002 WL 1609743, at *9-11; Ramon,
2002 WL 1841608, at *7-8. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted
permission to appeal in both cases and remanded the cases to the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration in light of
the supreme court’s Flake opinion; the defendants’ convictions were
affirmed upon remand. State v. Luis Anthony Ramon, No. W200203084-CCA-RM-CD, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2003);
State v. Claude W. Cheeks, No. E2002-03083-CCA-RM-CD, 2003 WL
22362766, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2003).
60 152 S.W.3d at 17.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 22.
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the 1995 amendment of section 39-11-501.

IV. THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Another issue that commonly arises with the insanity
defense is the scope of expert testimony. Subsection (c) of
section 39-11-501 was added in the 1995 amendment and
provides as follows: “No expert witness may testify as to
whether the defendant was or was not insane as set forth in
subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of fact
alone.” 63 Subsection (c) is unusual as it is an aberration from
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 704 which provides that
“[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” In fact, “[i]n Tennessee
the only ultimate issue about which an expert explicitly cannot
offer an opinion is whether the defendant was or was not sane
at the time of commission of the criminal offense.” 64
The unusual nature of subsection (c) has caused
considerable confusion about the scope of expert testimony as
it relates to the insanity defense. This is best illustrated by State
v. Hank Wise.65 In that case, the defense’s expert witness testified
that the defendant “was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct at the time of the offense due to his [suffering
from] delusional disorder.” 66 The State’s expert witness
“declined to give an opinion as to whether the [d]efendant
could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct because he
felt that was an issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” 67 Neither
expert was correct in their interpretation of what was
permissible under subsection (c). The defense’s expert
“exceeded the scope of permissible testimony” while the State’s

63 TENN. CODE

ANN. § 39-11-501(c) (1995).
v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 663 n.3 (Tenn. 1997); see also Tenn. R.
Evid. 704 (2018), 1996 Advisory Comm’n cmt. (noting that “[o]ne
ultimate issue is outside the scope of expert testimony” and citing
section 39-11-501(c)).
65 2014 WL 992102, at *15-16.
66 Id. at *15.
67 Id.
64 State
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expert “unnecessarily” narrowed the scope of his testimony.68
Subsection (c) is construed “narrowly because of the
interests at stake” and its unusual nature.69 An expert witness
“may testify that the defendant suffered from a severe mental
disease or defect.” 70 An expert witness “may also state whether
the defendant could have appreciated the nature or
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.”71
However, the expert cannot state “that the severe mental
disease or defect operated to prevent the defendant from
appreciating the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct.” 72 Put
another way, an expert witness’s testimony cannot connect the
two elements of the insanity defense. To illustrate, an expert
witness may testify about everything except for what has been
stricken through in the following statement: The Defendant, at
the time of the offense, (1) suffered from a severe mental disease
or defect, (2) was unable to appreciate either (a) the nature or
(b) the wrongfulness of their acts.

V. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURES
In most cases the trier of fact will reject the insanity
defense and convict the defendant at the conclusion of trial. On
appeal, the standard of review is very deferential to the trier of
fact’s verdict. A “verdict rejecting the insanity defense [will be
reversed] only if, considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could
have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of
the offense was established by clear and convincing
evidence.” 73 This standard is similar “to the familiar sufficiency
standard which appellate courts apply” when reviewing the
68 Id.

at *16.
v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

69 State
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.

Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554. This is also the standard of review that
applies on the rare occasion when the State appeals a trial court’ s
granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the
defendant established insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d at 22 n.1.
73
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sufficiency of the convicting evidence.74 “Where the proof is
contested, appellate courts should rarely reverse a jury’s
rejection of the insanity defense under this deferential standard
of review.” 75 This deferential standard of review is likely part
of the reason why the State often seeks to put on rebuttal proof
even though it has no burden to do so.
On the other hand, should the defendant be found not
guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court will order the
defendant “to be diagnosed and evaluated” by “the community
mental health agency or licensed private practitioner
designated . . . to serve the court.” 76 Based upon that evaluation,
the trial court can either: (1) release the defendant; (2) release
the defendant subject to mandatory outpatient treatment; or (3)
have the defendant involuntarily committed.77 However, if the
charge was first degree murder “or a Class A felony offense
under title 39, chapter 13,” then the trial court must either
commit the defendant or release the defendant subject to
mandatory outpatient treatment.78
If the defendant is involuntarily committed, due process
entitles the defendant to release “when he has recovered his
sanity or is no longer dangerous.” 79 Tennessee Code Annotated
section 33-6-602 provides for release to mandatory outpatient
treatment if the defendant “is likely to participate in outpatient
treatment with a legal obligation to do so” but “not likely to
participate . . . unless legally obligated to do so.” 80 Tennessee
Code Annotated section 33-7-706 provides for release to
Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 554. However, a challenge to the trier of fact’ s
rejection of the insanity defense on appeal is not technically a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as the two appella te
standards of review are “similar but not identical.” Odle, 2014 WL
6607013, at *4 n.2.
75 Flake, 88 S.W.3d at 556.
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(a)(1) (2018).
77 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(b) (2018).
78 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(g) (2018). Title 39, chapter 13 contains
“offenses against person.”
79 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
80 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-602(1) (2018). See State v. Kenneth Rya n
Mallady, No. M2010-02142-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 76901 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 10, 2012), for a more detailed discussion of release to
mandatory outpatient treatment under section 33-6-602.
74

34

5 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2018)

voluntary outpatient treatment if the defendant “is likely to
participate in outpatient treatment without being legally
obligated to do so.” 81 It should be noted that Tennessee Code
Annotated section 33-7-303 was amended in 2017 to provided
that if the charged offense was first degree murder or a Class A
felony from title 39, chapter 13, then a committed defendant can
only be released to mandatory outpatient treatment.82

VI. RELATED ISSUES
A. “DIMINISHED CAPACITY ”
“Diminished capacity” is often mistakenly referred to as
a defense and raised in conjunction with the insanity defense.83
However, “diminished capacity” is “merely a rule of
evidence.” 84 “While the law presumes sanity it does not
presume mens rea.” 85 To that end, “evidence which tends to
prove or disprove the required mental state is relevant and
generally admissible under Tennessee law.” 86 The term
“diminished capacity” refers to a defendant’s presentation of
expert testimony “aimed at negating the requisite culpable
mental state.” 87 Expert testimony admissible under the rule of
“diminished capacity” is not limited to just psychiatric
testimony, but includes any other form of expert testimony
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-706(2)(C) (2018). See State v. David Cloar,
No. E2015-01069-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4054948 (Tenn. Crim. App.
July 27, 2016), for a more detailed discussion of release to volunta ry
outpatient treatment under section 33-6-706.
82 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(g) (2018). Subsection (g) also provides
that the trial court is to review the defendant’s need for outpatient
treatment after six months and annually thereafter if mandatory
outpatient treatment is deemed to still be necessary.
83 See, e.g., Holton, 126 S.W.3d at 858-60; Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 913;
Halliburton, 2016 WL 7102747, at *12-14.
84 State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679. 689 (Tenn. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd
Cir. 1987)).
85 Id. (quoting State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1994)).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 688.
81
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“regarding a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite mental
state.” 88
To be admissible under the “diminished capacity” rule,
expert testimony “must demonstrate that the defendant’s
inability to form the requisite culpable mental state was the
product of a mental disease or defect, not just a particular
emotional state or mental condition.” 89 When a defendant is
attempting to disprove the culpable mental state with this type
of expert testimony, section 39-11-501(c)’s prohibition on expert
witnesses testifying about the ultimate issue in the case does not
apply.90 In fact, the opposite is true. The expert witness must
testify about the ultimate issue of fact for their testimony to be
admissible under the “diminished capacity” rule.

B. SENTENCING
Defendants will also typically argue in conjunction with
the insanity defense that their sentence should be mitigated due
to their suffering from a mental condition.91 The trial court can
consider that the defendant “was suffering from a mental or
physical condition that significantly reduced the defendant’s
culpability for the offense” as a mitigating factor in deciding the
length of the defendant’s sentence.92 However, the
enhancement and mitigating factors are merely advisory.93
Furthermore, trial courts are given wide discretion in
sentencing matters and “a trial court’s misapplication of an
enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the
sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from
the 1989 [Sentencing Reform] Act, as amended in 2005.” 94 Given
this deferential standard of appellate review, it behooves any
88 State

v. Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tenn. 2009).
958 S.W.2d at 690.
90 State v. Lesergio Duran Wilson, No. M2014-01487-CCA-R9 -CD,
2015 WL 5170970, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2015).
91 See, e.g., Wise, 2014 WL 992102, at *13-14, 18-19; State v. Timothy
Wade Davis, No. E2003-02162-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2378251, at *1315 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2004), aff’d, State v. Davis, 185 S.W.3 d
338 (Tenn. 2006); Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874, at *22.
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(8) (2018).
93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210(c) (2018).
94 State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012).
89 Hall,
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defendant seeking application of this mitigating factor to make
a strong showing and argument for it to the trial court during
the sentencing hearing.

C. POST-CONVICTION
Failing to present an insanity defense or to investigate
the petitioner’s mental health history is a common claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in post-conviction
proceedings.95 But to successfully raise such a claim on postconviction, the petitioner needs “to present the testimony of an
expert at the evidentiary hearing to explain what, if any, mental
health evidence trial counsel should have advanced at trial.”96
However, “the state is not required to provide expert assistance
to indigent non-capital post-conviction petitioners.”97 This lack
of funding for expert assistance will bar most post-conviction
petitioners from successfully raising such a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.98

VII. CONCLUSION
The rationale behind the insanity defense “is that those
See, e.g., George Timmons v. State, No. E2017-00335-CCA-R3 -PC,
2018 WL 1391630 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2018); Phillip Alexander
McWilliams v. State, No. E2017-00275-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 5046354
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2017); Tyler James Schaeffer v. State, No.
E2016-01614-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 4477345 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6,
2017).
96 Demario Johnson v. State, No. W2011-02123-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL
772795, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2013) (citing Black v. State, 794
S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)).
97 Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 696-97 (Tenn. 1995).
98 A closely related issue, but outside the scope of this article, is that
due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations
for post-conviction
actions when the petitioner’s
menta l
incompetence prevents the petitioner from complying with the
statute. Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 623-24 (Tenn. 2013). The
competency standard is whether the petitioner “possesses ‘the present
capacity to appreciate [his or her] position and make a rational choice
with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or . . . is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
95
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who are mentally ill and cannot fully comprehend their actions
should not, in justice, be held responsible for those actions.”99
Moreover, from a policy standpoint “millions of mentally ill
persons [clog] the [American] criminal justice system” as our
courts “are not focused on treatment” of the chronically
mentally ill.100 To that end, the insanity defense “allows for
rehabilitation of the mentally ill,” “removes those from society
who are dangerous,” allows “them to be treated so that they are
no longer dangerous,” and “prevents the mentally ill . . . from
being forced into a prison system where they will not receive
proper treatment.” 101
In 2005, an attorney for a post-conviction petitioner
asserted that since the 1995 amendment to section 39-11-501 no
defendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity “in a
contested jury trial.” 102 It appears that this record has not
improved in the subsequent 13 years as only one appellate
decision since the 1995 amendment has concluded that the
defendant established insanity by clear and convincing
evidence. Given its infrequent use and the poor chance of
success, it begs the question whether section 39-11-501 in its
current form fulfills the rationale and public policy underlying
the insanity defense. However, Tennessee attorneys will have
to contend with the current version of the insanity defense as
outlined in this article until the General Assembly sees fit to
amend section 39-11-501 in an attempt to make it more
responsive to that underlying rationale and public policy.

substantially affect the petitioner’s capacity.’” Reid ex rel. Martiniano
v. State, 396 S.W.3d 478, 512-13 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 28, § 11(B)(1)). However, to survive summary dismissal, the
petitioner must make a prima facie showing of mental incompet en ce
by submitting with the petition “affidavits, depositions, medica l
reports, or other credible evidence that contain specific factua l
allegations showing the petitioner’s incompetence.” Id. at 512.
99 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 358.
100 Hooper, supra note 3, at 413.
101 Kachulis, supra note 4, at 358-59.
102 Kelley v. State, No. M2004-01158-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2255854, at
*12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2005).

